The coverage of direct actions varies greatly from course to course and the wide variety of potential questions refl ects this. You may be tested on your knowledge of procedure and your ability to evaluate this, for instance in relation to enforcement actions under Article 258 TFEU.
As well as actions brought indirectly to the Court of Justice through preliminary references
• from national courts under Article 267, the TFEU also provides for actions that are brought directly before the Court.
Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European an act addressed to the applicant an act addressed to another person which is of direct and individual concern to the applicant a regulatory act which is of direct concern to the applicant and which does not entail implementing measures
Locus standi: non-privileged applicants
A direct link or an unbroken chain of causation between the EU measure and the damage suffered: Member State has no discretion in implementation (Municipality of Differdange)
Individual concern

Lack of competence (eg Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising))
Infringement of an essential procedural requirement (eg Roquette Frères)
Infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application (eg Transocean Marine Paint)
Misuse of powers (eg UK v Council)
An act addressed to another person Applicant must show both direct and individual concern A regulatory act which is of direct concern to the applicant and which does not entail implementing measures Reform: Court of Justice rejects less restrictive test (UPA, Jégo-Quéré) 'Closed class' test: an applicant is individually concerned if it was a member of class of persons that was fixed and ascertainable at the date the measure was passed Originally, Article 258 was intended to be the principal mechanism for enforcement of EU law. However, since the development of the doctrines of direct effect, indirect effect, and state liability, providing for the enforcement of EU law in the national court at the suit of individuals, direct actions in the Court of Justice form only part of the system of 'dual enforcement' of EU law.
Enforcement actions by the Commission (Article 258 TFEU)
What constitutes a breach?
Whilst the Treaty provides no defi nition, the Court of Justice has held that breaches include not only acts but also failures to act. Commonly, infringements comprise failure to implement directives or to implement them correctly, or direct breaches of the Treaty. 
Commission v Belgium
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
The discretion may be criticized as diluting the effectiveness of EU law enforcement.
The Commission is not obliged to keep the complainant informed of the progress of any action that it may be taking, though in a 2002 Communication, it undertook to keep complainants more closely informed.
Member States as defendants
Although national governments are the defendants in Article 258 proceedings, an action may be brought in respect of the failure of any state agency, whether executive, legislative or judicial.
Commission v Belgium (Case 77/69) [1970] ECR 237
Belgium maintained that it was not responsible for its Parliament's failure, through lack of time, to amend national tax legislation, which violated [EU] law. The Court of Justice held that Member States are responsible 'whatever the agency of the State whose action or inaction is the cause of the failure to fulfi l its obligations, even in the case of a constitutionally independent institution'.
Procedure
Administrative stage
Article 258 provides that 'If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfi l an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the state concerned the opportunity to submit its observations'. The administrative
phase incorporates the required elements: the Member State concerned must be given the opportunity to submit its observations; if the Commission is not satisfi ed, it delivers a reasoned opinion.
The Commission's practice is fi rst to raise the matter informally with the Member State. If not satisfi ed with the response, it commences the formal procedure.
Formal proceedings begin with the 'letter of notice' to the Member State setting out the Commission's reasons for suspecting an infringement. The Member State must be given a reasonable period of time to respond. Typically, there follow discussions between the Commission and the Member State, with a view to negotiating a settlement. If this proves impossible, the Commission moves to the next phase, the reasoned opinion.
The reasoned opinion sets out precisely the grounds of complaint and specifi es a time limit within which the Member State is required to take action to end the infringement. In determining whether the deadline is reasonable, the Court of Justice takes account of all the circumstances. 
Commission v France
Judicial stage
Once the time limit for a response to the reasoned opinion has passed, if the matter is not settled the Commission may commence proceedings in the Court of Justice. Here, the Commission cannot rely on matters not raised in the reasoned opinion. Interested Member States, but not individuals, may intervene in the proceedings.
Revision tip
Questions may require consideration of the procedure -be familiar with this.
Defences
The Court of Justice has generally been dismissive of defences raised by Member States, save for those based on a denial of the alleged facts or of the obligation.
R Revision tip evision tip
Questions may require consideration of the procedure -be familiar with this. The Court of Justice accepted that the bombing of the data-processing centre involved in the implementation of a directive could amount to force majeure and would provide a defence to nonimplementation. However, a delay of over four years in implementing was too long and inexcusable.
Political or economic diffi culties
This defence is unlikely to succeed. 
Commission v UK (
Reciprocity
The Court of Justice has rejected the defence of reciprocity -that non-compliance is justifi ed because other Member States have not complied or an EU institution has failed to act. 
Commission v Belgium and Luxembourg
Actual compliance
Where a national provision confl icts with EU law, it is no defence that the provision is not applied in practice or that there is administrative compliance with EU law. 
Revision tip
Get to grips with the cases on defences -you may need to apply these to facts (problem questions) or discuss them (essay questions). Member State has failed to fufi l its obligation to notify measures transposing a directive, it may specify the amount of lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court fi nds that there is an infringement it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment not exceeding the specifi ed amount, taking effect on a date specifi ed by the Court.
Interim measures
R Revision tip evision tip
Get to grips with the cases on defences -you may need to apply these to facts (problem questions) or discuss them (essay questions).
Enforcement actions brought by Member States (Article 259 TFEU)
A Member State may bring an action against another Member State which it considers has failed to fulfi l EU obligations. First, the complaint must be brought before the Commission which, before any Court action is taken, asks for submissions from both states, delivers a reasoned opinion, and seeks a settlement. Sometimes, the Commission takes over the action, 
Revision tip
Locus standi (standing) is the most contentious element of Article 263. Questions frequently focus on this aspect.
Acts that may be challenged 
R Revision tip evision tip
In IBM v Commission (Case 60/81) the Court defi ned a reviewable act as 'any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position'.
Unfortunately, whether a particular act results in such a change is not always easily ascertained. The Court's conclusions have sometimes been controversial, as may be illustrated by IBM and SFEI. In IBM, the Court refused to allow IBM to challenge a letter from the Commission setting out its intention to institute competition proceedings and the basis of its case. By contrast, a letter from the Commission stating that it intended to close its fi le on a complaint alleging breaches of competition law was held to be susceptible to judicial review (SFEI v Commission (Case C-39/93P)).
Time limit
Actions must be brought within two months of publication of the measure or its notifi cation to the applicant or, in the absence of either, the date on which it came to the applicant's knowledge.
Why seek judicial review?
Judicial review provides applicants with the means to challenge EU acts which they 
Revision tip
Consider the cases carefully, thinking about the kinds of situations in which individuals have sought to challenge EU acts.
Standing: who may bring Article 263 proceedings?
Standing or locus standi, meaning the right to bring a legal challenge before the Court, depends upon the prospective applicant's status. There are three classes of applicantsprivileged, semi-privileged, and non-privileged.
R Revision tip evision tip
Consider the cases carefully, thinking about the kinds of situations in which individuals have sought to challenge EU acts. 
Non-privileged applicants
These comprise all other applicants, be they natural persons (including individuals in business), or legal persons (companies). Challenges by non-privileged applicants begin in the General Court, with appeal lying to the Court of Justice. Unlike privileged and semi-privileged applicants, non-privileged applicants' right of access to the Court is severely limited.
Revision tip
Non-privileged applicants fi gure prominently in questions. Make sure you are confi dent about the principles applying to them.
Standing: non-privileged applicants
The Lisbon Treaty amended the provisions of Article 230 EC relating to the standing of nonprivileged applicants.
Article 263 TFEU provides that:
Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.
In other words a non-privileged applicant may challenge:
an act addressed to the applicant • an act addressed to another person which is of direct and individual concern to the • applicant a regulatory act which is of direct concern to the applicant, and which does not entail • implementing measures
'An act addressed to that person'
With respect to acts addressed directly to the applicant, such as Commission decisions on competition law breaches addressed directly to companies, admissibility is unproblematic.
Such measures may be challenged without restriction, provided they are brought within the
R Revision tip evision tip
Non-privileged applicants fi gure prominently in questions. Make sure you are confi dent about the principles applying to them. 
'An act addressed to another person'
'An act addressed to another person' clearly includes a decision addressed to another person (typically to a Member State or Member States). To challenge such a measure, the applicant must establish both direct and individual concern.
By contrast, the position regarding regulations is less clear. Previously, under Article 230 EC, in order to establish standing to challenge a regulation (in addition to the requirements for direct and individual concern), an applicant had to show that the measure was 'a decision in the form of a regulation'. Although the Court of Justice addressed this provision in a number of cases, the precise scope of the 'decision in disguise' requirement remained uncertain. With the Lisbon Treaty amendments, this provision has been abandoned in its entirety.
However, fresh uncertainty has been introduced by the new provision in Article 263 TFEU concerning 'regulatory acts'.
'A regulatory act which is of direct concern to the applicant, and which does not entail implementing measures'
Article 263 affords standing to a non-privileged applicant in respect of 'a regulatory act which is of direct concern to the applicant, and which does not entail implementing measures'. Unfortunately, the Treaties do not defi ne 'regulatory act', though the TFEU makes a distinction between 'legislative acts' (adopted by the Council and the European Parliament under legislative procedures) and 'non-legislative acts' (adopted by the Commission under delegated powers) (Articles 289-290 TFEU). If defi ned broadly, 'regulatory act' could include both legislative regulations and non-legislative regulations. Conversely, if defi ned narrowly, 'regulatory act' could well be confi ned to non-legislative regulations.
The broad defi nition of 'regulatory act' would result in a more liberal approach to standing for non-privileged applicants, since only direct concern would need to be established in relation to both legislative and non-legislative regulations, provided the regulation in question did not entail implementing measures. On the other hand, if the narrow defi nition were to be adopted, legislative regulations would presumably fall within the scope of 'acts addressed to another person' and applicants would need to establish both direct and individual concern.
It will be for the European Court of Justice to decide the meaning of 'regulatory act' and the Court's conclusion on this point will no doubt be awaited with great interest. Whatever the outcome, 'direct concern' (in relation to all acts, save those addressed to the applicant) and 'individual concern' (in relation to 'acts addressed to another person') will continue to be key concepts in EU judicial review.
Direct concern
To establish direct concern the applicant must show a direct link or unbroken chain of caus- 
Municipality of Differdange v Commission (Case 222/83) [1984] ECR 2889
A Commission decision addressed to Luxembourg authorized it to grant aid to steel producers, provided they reduced production capacity. The applicant sought annulment of the decision, claiming that reduced production would result in the loss of local tax revenue. The Court of Justice held that the decision left the national authorities and producers discretion in implementation, particularly regarding the choice of factories for closure. It was the exercise of that discretion that affected the applicant, which was therefore not directly concerned by the Commission decision.
Identifi cation of direct concern can entail fi ne distinctions.
Paraiki-Patraiki v Commission (Case 11/82) [1985] ECR 207
The applicant companies sought to challenge a Commission decision authorizing France to impose quotas on cotton yarn imports from Greece. The French authorities had discretion, since they could choose whether or not to use the authorization. Despite this, the Court of Justice held that the possibility that the authorities would not impose quotas was 'purely theoretical', since France already restricted Greek yarn imports and had requested permission to impose even stricter quotas. The applicants were therefore directly concerned by the decision.
With respect to 'regulatory acts', the distinction (if any) between direct concern and 'entailing implementing measures' remains to be determined.
Individual concern
This requirement is applied very restrictively and has proved a signifi cant hurdle for applicants. The Plaumann formula is the classic test.
Plaumann v Commission (Case 25/62) [1963] ECR 95
Plaumann, a clementine importer, sought to challenge a Commission decision addressed to Germany refusing it authorization to reduce customs duties on clementines imported into the 
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
The Plaumann test has been criticized as unrealistic commercially and, in practice, virtually impossible to satisfy. Whilst theoretically anyone in the EU can set up business in a particular sector, for instance as a clementine importer, this may not be possible where, as is often the case, the sector is dominated by a small number of operators. Against that commercial reality, it can be argued that anyone might, in theory, enter the market or, more generally, that the distinguishing characteristics claimed by the applicant may in the future be acquired by any other person. Consequently, it is diffi cult to establish individual concern.
Despite the diffi culties, non-privileged applicants are sometimes able to establish individual concern. They have done so, in particular, when they were a member of a class of persons that was fi xed and ascertainable (a 'closed class') at the date the measure was passed and, consequently, the measure had only retrospective impact on a specifi c group of persons.
Paraiki-Patraiki v Commission (Case 11/82) [1985] ECR 207
It will be recalled that the applicants sought annulment of a Commission decision authorizing
France to impose quotas on cotton yarn imports from Greece. Considering individual concern, the Court of Justice declared that the mere fact that the applicants exported the product to France was not suffi cient to distinguish them from any other current or future exporter. However, they were distinguished by the fact that, before the adoption of the decision, they had entered into contracts for sale of the products. They were held to be individually concerned.
Because the applicants had entered into contracts before the decision was adopted, they were part of a closed class of applicants, a class that was fi xed and ascertainable at the date the measure was passed.
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
The Court of Justice has held steadfastly to the restrictive interpretation of 'individual concern', doubtless fearful of opening the fl oodgates to challenges to EU law and of hindering the institutions' ability to adopt legislation in the general interest. In defence of this stance, the Court referred to the other possible routes open to applicants, in particular indirect challenge through Article 267 and damages claims against the EU under Article 340. The continuing criticism of the Court's unswerving approach, denying access to judicial review to large numbers of non-privileged applicants, culminated in pressure for reform in UPA and Jégo-Quéré. Both concerned challenges to regulations.
Union de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA) (Case 50/00 P) [2002] ECR I-6677
UPA's challenge to a regulation withdrawing aid for olive oil producers had been held inadmis- Before the judgment in UPA, and in the light of Advocate-General Jacobs' opinion in that case , in Jégo-Quéré v Commission (Case T-177/01), the CFI called for review of the test for individual concern . It proposed that an individual should be regarded as individually concerned by a regulation if it 'affects his legal position in a manner which is both defi nite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him'. The Court of Justice subsequently upheld the Commission's appeal against the CFI's decision in Jégo-Quéré, again reaffi rming the Plaumann test for individual concern (Commission v Jégo-Quéré (Case C-263/02P)).
Revision tip
Be familiar with the key points on standing for non-privileged applicants -direct concern, individual concern, and the new provision on 'regulatory acts'
Grounds for annulment
The grounds for annulment, which may well overlap in individual cases, are set out in Article 263(2).
Lack of competence
Here, the institution adopting the measure does not have the necessary power. For instance, in Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) (Case C-376/98) a directive banning tobacco advertising, identifi ed as a public health measure, was annulled because it was adopted under a Treaty article concerning the internal market. Lack of competence is similar to ultra vires in English law.
Infringement of an essential procedural requirement
This arose, for instance, in Roquette Frères v Council (Case 138/79), concerning a failure to consult Parliament before the adoption of a measure, as required by the Treaty.
R Revision tip evision tip
Be familiar with the key points on standing for non-privileged applicants -direct concern, individual concern, and the new provision on 'regulatory acts' 
Misuse of powers
This entails the adoption of a measure for a purpose other than that intended by the Treaty provision constituting its legal base. In UK v Council (Case C-84/94) for instance, the UK argued, unsuccessfully, that the Working Time Directive was wrongly based on Article 118a
EC (now 153 TFEU) concerning health and safety at work.
Effect of annulment
If the grounds are established, the measure is declared void and the institution concerned must take measures to comply with the judgment.
Action for failure to act: Article 265 TFEU
Article 265 allows privileged and non-privileged applicants to challenge inaction by the EU institutions, the European Central Bank and the bodies, offi ces, or agencies of the EU, where they have a duty to act. That duty must be suffi ciently well defi ned. Originally, strict locus standi requirements were imposed on non-privileged applicants. Subsequently, the standing requirements have been relaxed.
European Parliament v Council
Bethell v Commission
T Port v Bundesanstalt für Landeswirtschaft und Ernährung (Case C-68/95) [1996] ECR I-6065
The Court of Justice applied locus standi requirements analogous to those under [Article 263 TFEU] , holding that the applicant must show that it would be directly and individually concerned by the potential act.
An action will be admissible only if the institution concerned has fi rst been called upon to act and has failed to defi ne its position within two months. Following a declaration of failure to act, the institution must take the necessary measures to comply with the Court's judgment (Article 266).
Relationship between Articles 263 and 265
Articles 263 and 265 complement each other by covering, respectively, illegal action and illegal inaction. They have been described by the Court of Justice as prescribing 'one and the same method of recourse' (Chevally v Commission (Case 15/70)). They can be pleaded in the alternative but both cannot be applied to the same circumstance.
Eridania v Commission (Cases 10&18/68) [1969] ECR 459
The Article 340 provides a mechanism for recovery of damages by individuals who have suffered loss as a result of EU action:
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. This is an independent form of action, so an applicant need not fi rst secure annulment under Article 263.
In cases of damage caused by EU offi cials, the Court of Justice will apply the test in Sayag v Leduc (Case 9/69): the EU 'is only liable for acts of its servants which, by virtue of an internal and direct relationship, are the necessary extension of the tasks entrusted to [it]'.
Where, more commonly, the claim concerns an act of an EU institution, three elements must be established: a wrongful or illegal act, damage, and causation (Lütticke v Commission) (Case 4/69)).
Wrongful act: the original approach in Schöppenstedt
Under the so-called Schöppenstedt formula, a distinction was drawn between legislative and administrative acts (Schöppenstedt Aktien-Zuckerfabrik v Council (Case 5/71)). With regard to administrative breaches, liability could be established on the basis of illegality alone.
Administrative breaches
Adams provides an example.
Adams v Commission (Case 145/83) [1985] ECR 3539
Adams had alerted the Commission to alleged competition law breaches by his employer, the Swiss pharmaceutical company Hoffmann-La Roche. The Commission disclosed documents to the company from which the latter identifi ed Adams as the informant. Subsequently Adams was convicted of economic espionage in Switzerland. In [Article 340] proceedings brought by Adams, the Court of Justice found that the Commission's negligence in disclosing the documents to La Roche and its failure to warn Adams, who had moved to Italy, that he would be prosecuted if he returned to Switzerland, gave rise to liability in damages.
General legislative measures involving choices of economic policy
In Schöppenstedt the Court applied a more rigorous test to general legislative measures involving choices of economic policy. For these measures, liability arose only where there was a 'suffi ciently fl agrant violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the (Cases 83 & 94/76, 4, 15 & 40/77) [1978] ECR 1209
Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH v Council and Commission
In order to reduce surplus stocks of skimmed milk powder, a regulation was passed requiring its purchase for use in poultry feed. Previously, the Court of Justice had held the regulation void, as discriminatory and disproportionate. Here, the applicant claimed an adverse effect on its business because the measure increased the cost of feed. The Court found that the regulation affected wide categories of traders, reducing its effect on individual businesses. Further, the regulation had only limited impact on the price of feed, by comparison with the impact of world market price variations. Consequently, the breach was not manifest and grave.
In other cases the Court focused on the nature of the breach. In Amylum it applied an even more rigorous test, requiring the institution's conduct to be 'verging on the arbitrary'.
Amylum NV v Council and Commission (Isoglucose) (Cases 116 & 124/77) [1979] ECR 3497
A small group of isoglucose producers sought damages in respect of a regulation imposing production levies, which had previously been held invalid for discrimination because no levies were imposed on sugar, a competing product. Despite the serious impact of the measure, including the liquidation of one of the companies, the action failed. The Court of Justice held that the institution's conduct could not be regarded as 'verging on the arbitrary'.
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
In applying these restrictive tests the Court of Justice sought to ensure that the risk of successful damages claims by individuals did not hinder the legislative function. The strictness of the tests meant that such actions rarely succeeded.
Bergaderm: a different approach
The development of state liability caused the Court of Justice to reconsider its approach to EU liability. In Bergaderm it aligned the principles relating to state and EU liability, This represents a signifi cant departure from Schöppenstedt. The rule infringed need no longer be a 'superior rule of law', but merely intended to confer rights on individuals. The decisive test for a suffi ciently serious breach is the degree of discretion accorded to the institution, rather than the arbitrariness of the act or the seriousness of the damage. It is likely that the additional factors set out in Brasserie du Pêcheur will be applied, namely the clarity of the rule, whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, and whether the breach was intentional or voluntary. Finally, a distinction is no longer drawn between administrative and legislative acts.
Revision tip
Be ready to discuss the developing test for a 'wrongful act' under Article 340 and the closer alignment of state and EU liability.
Damage
The applicant must prove the loss, which must be quantifi able and exceed the loss arising from the normal economic risks inherent in business. In HNL, for instance, the loss did not satisfy this requirement. Damage to person or property and economic loss are recoverable, but the Court will not compensate speculative loss. Steps must be taken to mitigate the loss.
Damages will be reduced if the applicant has in some way contributed to its loss.
Causation
To establish the necessary causal link, the applicant must show that the damage is a suffi ciently direct consequence of the institution's breach. Compensation is not available for every harmful consequence, however remote. A Commission decision addressed to Luxembourg authorized it to grant aid to steel producers, provided they reduced production capacity.
R Revision tip evision tip
The decision left the national authorities, and the companies, discretion in implementation in the choice of factories to be closed. The exercise of that discretion affected the applicant, which was not therefore directly concerned.
Paraiki-Patraiki v Commission (Case 11/82) [1985] ECR 207
The applicants sought to annul a Commission decision authorizing France to impose quotas on cotton yarn imports from Greece.
The possibility that France would not use its discretion was 'purely theoretical'; it had already restricted Greek yarn imports and requested permission to impose even stricter quotas. The applicants were therefore directly concerned by the decision. Damages claim concerning withdrawal of production subsidies.
The damage caused must be a suffi ciently direct consequence of the institution's breach.
Exam questions Exam questions
Problem question
In 2007 
